RAAI Runtime Security Model™
Assessment, authorization, execution, and audit for workflows whose authority changes over time.
Research on agent identity, delegated authority, secure tool invocation, threat modeling, and controls at execution time.
My research examines how instructions become actions across tools, identities, memory, and enterprise systems.
An editorially reviewed technical article on agent identity, authority, tools, memory, and runtime threat modeling. DOI: 10.1145/3848521.
Read article →The Authority-Aware Agentic Threat Model examines intent, context, authority, tools, memory, delegation, and action composition.
Read overview →A taxonomy and control framework for threats across autonomous agent workflows, including the RAAI runtime control loop.
Read overview →Proposed five security invariants (INV-01–05) and fourteen adversarial vectors (AV-01–14), refined through technical review with OpenOBA.
View project credit →Built independent Python conformance checks and a specification-based resolution runner. Public documentation credits 13 resolution vectors and the R08/R13 boundary clarification.
Read the acknowledgment →Reviewed ERDL resolution verification and distinguished checked rule-set sizes from an unbounded proof. The project credits the review in its public acknowledgments.
View formal-verification credit →Proposed evidence for reconstructing authority across agents, sub-agents, and tools, including effective constraints and revocation. The public discussion records the proposal and technical responses.
Read the SAFE discussion →Proposed guidance on MCP tool permissions, inter-agent trust, execution-plan validation, and runtime authorization in the LLM Excessive Agency guidance.
View the submitted proposal →Proposed seven runtime-authority controls and seven adversarial test cases covering revocation, denial continuity, protected effects, and authority conservation.
Read the control proposal →Proposed checking whether an agent still has authority at the moment it makes a binding commitment, with separate test cases for expired authority and stale revocation evidence.
Read the A2A discussionAssessment, authorization, execution, and audit for workflows whose authority changes over time.
Attack paths through prompts, context, memory, tools, APIs, identities, permissions, and downstream actions.
Architecture, runtime protection, monitoring, and governance controls for enterprise AI systems.
Data poisoning and indirect prompt-injection risks across the retrieval-to-generation workflow.
Publisher listing →Policy checks that consider an agent’s identity, requested action, resource sensitivity, and invocation context.
Publisher listing →Agent identity, delegated authority, runtime monitoring, prompt-injection defense, and incident response.
Map inputs, identities, delegated authority, and tool actions. Turn abuse paths into tests.
Read the guide →Review authorization at the service boundary, token audience, workflow state, and outbound access.
Review MCP controls →Contain execution, preserve the authority trail, investigate downstream impact, and restart safely.
Open the response guide →A paper by researchers at the University of Babylon cites my Runtime Authority-Aware Threat Modeling paper in its references.
Read the citing paperPrzemysław Majdak discusses the seven dimensions of the Authority-Aware Agentic Threat Model in an article on agent memory and state, and links to the JRTCSE paper.
Read the external article →Lee Bryant references the VentureBeat article in a discussion of human oversight, agent autonomy, and runtime trust.
Read the Shift*Academy article →J. Benjamin Espagné credits the CSO Online article and extends the first-day incident-response discussion with European regulatory context.
Read the NeoSec article →